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Abstract 
Discussions of global ethics—about the types of normative claim made on individuals 
and groups, not only states, by individuals and groups around the world—have had to move 
beyond the categories inherited in the International Relations discipline. Many important 
positions are not captured by a framework developed for discussion of inter-state relations. The 
blindspots seem to reflect an outmoded expectation that (i) giving low normative weight to 
national boundaries correlates strongly with (ii) giving more normative weight to people 
beyond one's national boundaries, and vice versa; in other words that these two dimensions in 
practice reduce to one. The paper develops an enriched categorization. We need to recognize 
the separate importance of the two dimensions, and thus distinguish various types of 'cosmopol-
itan' position, including many varieties of libertarian position which give neither national 
boundaries nor pan-human obligations much (if any) importance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Global or world ethics is the study of ethical claims made on human beings—
individually or in groups, not only grouped as states—in their relations with individuals 
and groups (again not only states) throughout the world (Dower, 1998).
ii
 Authors such 
as Nigel Dower and David Held have examined the broadening of attention beyond 
states, in the context of the intensification of global interconnections and international-
izing of problems of absolute poverty, conflict, environment, refugees and more.
iii
  
 For pursuing the global ethics agenda, this paper argues for wide-ranging descrip-
tion and analysis of existing ethics, including practices as well as doctrines, and not 
only the elaboration, evaluation and advocacy of old or new formal doctrines. Section I 
suggests the importance of this sort of sociology of ideas and practices, by reference to 
the growth of groups and persons who have attenuated or no national loyalties and 
instead worldwide but not pan-human loyalties, and to assumptions yet that nations 
form communities bound by a social contract. 
 Attention to a wider range of actors, and to practices as well as doctrines, leads the 
study of global ethics beyond traditional normative International Relations with its 
focus on the relations between states. The common expectation has been that positions 
which stress the normative importance of national boundaries will also put low weight 
on obligations that cross national boundaries, in particular obligations on the basis of a 
common humanity; and vice versa, that low normative weight to national boundaries 
will go with higher weight to global obligations. We will see that the expectation is 
misleading, and that a wider range of positions must be investigated, including 
positions which give neither national boundaries nor pan-human global obligations 
much (or sometimes, any) importance. Section II essays an extended taxonomy of 
standpoints in global ethics. 
 Section III takes further the identification and clarification of these ‘neither-nor’ 
positions. They include enormously influential anti-humanist stances, notably for 
unrestricted markets and even for unrestricted contestation as the principle for all 
spheres of life. We will specify various such positions: in current responses to crises in 
the supply of global public goods; in the reconsideration and decline of international 
aid in the 1980s and 90s; and in the Darwinian ‘ethics’ of those who will trade in 
anything. 
 Section IV offers a set of conclusions and underlines the importance of descriptive 
ethics for any realistic and effective practical ethics. 
 
 
I.  FROM SOCIAL CONTRACT TO MARKET CONTRACT 
 
Namibia is an unusual country with a painful history. It has had at one stage possibly 
the highest Gini coefficient for income inequality in the world. Its large groups of white 
settlers, both German and Afrikaner, enjoy exceptionally high average incomes, in what 
has been otherwise very largely a country of poor people. This is a country with 
manifestly no integrated national community. Many white Namibians seem like a 
continuing colonial group or as in effect long-term expatriates who require—in other 
words demand—almost the same rewards as short-term expatriates plus greater rights 
and opportunities than them, and who are likely to emigrate when they no longer 
receive these. An extreme and minor case, surely?  
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 Let us turn to a country with almost a sixth of the world’s population: India. If one 
walks the streets of a metropolis in India nowadays one can sometimes get a feeling 
that not only the rich but also increasing numbers of the professional classes have 
morally seceded from the nation (cf. Bhaduri & Nayyar 1996). Many seem to live now 
the same in various ways as do Indian professional emigrants abroad, or foreign 
tourists, or those same tourists when back home in the North. The smartly dressed well-
to-do proceed from gleaming cool office or home interiors, communicating to each 
other on their cell phones, through streets with many wretched begging people whom 
they generally ignore, to shops and hotels full of luxuries and imports from America, 
Britain and Singapore for which they can evidently afford to pay world prices. In the 
1990s while consumerism reached new levels in India, public social sector expenditures 
were squeezed. The affluent seem to have become semi-detached in their own country, 
inhabitants of a quasi-apartheid system moving further in the direction of Brazil or 
South Africa. In effect they declare that if the elites and middle classes of other parts of 
the globe are entitled to live in a certain way, then so are they — by the principle of 
equal real income (post-taxation) for equal work. 
 What's new? Was it ever different? Consider masses of Indians starving in the 
1870s and 1890s in the interior, or in the streets of Calcutta in 1943 while grain was 
procured for war purposes; or the Irish expiring en masse in the 1840s while grain was 
exported and the society balls rolled on in Dublin and London. The ruling and profes-
sional classes of those periods were often international too, with investments and 
family members spread across the world. But after India’s independence in 1947 drastic 
mass starvation has been prevented by timely public action. And while the failures to 
attend in non-starvation times to the basic needs of up to half the population—and the 
concomitant evasion of taxation—were a national and global scandal (Harriss-White & 
Subramaniam, 1999), the national community appeared as a dominant image and 
aspiration. External criticism was sometimes resisted precisely on those grounds: ‘You 
cannot criticize or share in policy discussions about India if you are not a resident 
national, sharing these conditions, this destiny, its joys and pains’—a principle of, if not 
equal pay for equal work, then at least equal voice only if equal pay.
iv
  
At least three shifts may have happened, in significant measure, in the past genera-
tion. 
 The ethics have been globalized and liberalized: elites may comment on anything, 
worldwide, but have been liberated from obligation. The principle espoused by 
many has become: “If we are obligated to the poor here in India [no longer ‘our 
poor’], then so are you. Since you are not, then nor are we.” 
 Professional and business elites in the South can now emigrate mentally rather than 
physically, thanks to the intensity of trans-national communication and flows. The 
software engineer in Bangalore, Chennai (Madras), Hyderabad or Pune employed 
directly or indirectly by a corporation in Europe or America can now live in many 
ways almost the life of his emigrated classmate in the North. 
 The vastly eased and intensified transnational contacts and flows—messages, visits, 
financial transfers—allow even an average professional family of the new millenni-
um to act as a global unit. What made the Rothschilds special and supreme in the 
early and mid 19th century is now mundane. 
 
 My main point is however not historical, not dependent on whether or not this sort 
of stance is new or has grown; rather that such positions are widespread and significant. 
India was already a country where group and family loyalties took precedence, where 
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condensation into a national entity was quite limited. Great numbers still emigrate 
physically — a high proportion of the best Indian engineers, computer specialists, 
doctors, and scientists of every description: sometimes even the majority of the output 
of elite training institutions heavily supported with public funds as a subsidy to elite 
and upper middle class families. Once abroad many remain in some ways mentally in 
India: in an émigré cocoon, and intensively connected home through telephones, e-mail 
and chatrooms, money transfers, visits in both directions, etcetera. Many do return. 
Whether they return home, and stay home, may make little difference to their loyalties: 
their life-norms are often largely the same as the émigrés. They commonly want to 
work for the same corporations, acquire, consume, travel and perhaps invest abroad, 
send their children there for studies and work. Often the extended families function as 
multi-national corporations: they are the project, more important as a machinery, base 
of identity and focus of investment than the nation. The nation is one base for their 
activities, but not predominant organizationally, let alone normatively.  
 Many authors continue to assume that there are national social contracts, and that 
the condensation into national entities and largely territorially (rather than functionally) 
based governance which occurred gradually between the 16
th
 and 20
th
 centuries remains 
dominant.
v
  
A responsible national government speaks for all the people in its country; as such, it has 
the duty to protect its vulnerable citizens from the harmful effects of free markets while 
taking advantage of the benefits they offer. … a responsible national government has the 
duty to protect weaker portions of society from stronger portions... (McKeever, 2000-2001; 
final essay). 
 
‘A responsible national government’ is assumed by McKeever to be responsible to 1. 
‘all the people in its country’; not to 2. ‘the country’ as measured by financial wealth, 
nor to 3. all people in the world. The proposal to protect weaker sections may rely on 
the existence of a feeling of national community. McKeever presents a quasi-
communitarian model in which producers in rich Northern countries (say, farmers) 
should be protected against international competition, by governments which represent 
and sustain national communities. These governments will not represent also the 
interests of outsiders. Insofar as such interests are reflected through effective demand in 
the market, and hence financial rewards for some nationals, the governments are 
supposed to control markets rather than be controlled by them, and to represent all 
nationals, not only those who receive market rewards.  
 Thomas Nagel uses a partly similar model in his reflections on ‘The Problem of 
Global Justice’ (2005). He presumes that there exist national ‘societies’, whose internal 
relations should be governed in ways that inevitably remain radically different from 
‘the practices that govern our relations with individuals in other societies’ (p.118: 
emphasis added). From Hobbes’ thesis that the operations of justice rely on the 
presence of a sovereign power, Nagel projects that the very notion of justice is 
inapplicable to contexts which lack a sovereign power, namely to relations with 
members of ‘other societies’. 
Onora O’Neill’s remarks on communitarianism may have a wider relevance: 
 
The upsurge of communitarian thinking [in the North] about virtue and (in small measure) 
about justice in the 1980s fits oddly with the reality that economic and political structures 
were and are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan. Might it reflect the fact that cosmopoli-
tan claims are no longer advantageous to [Northern] elites, as they perhaps were or were 
thought to be in the recently past era of imperialism? In a post-imperial world, cosmopoli-
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tan arrangements threaten rich states with uncontrolled economic forces and immigration 
and demands for aid for the poor of the world, and autocratic states with demands that 
human rights be guaranteed across boundaries. (O’Neill, 1996: 28-9) 
 
 David Held derives a different picture than Nagel, from much more extensive, 
concrete consideration of diverse modern-day global interconnections: we exist in not a 
system of block-like nation-states – not even the United States is such a block – but a 
world system of innumerable overlapping communities. And as in Toni Erskine’s 
‘embedded cosmopolitanism’, an inclusive ethic can arise because individuals are 
simultaneously members of many, overlapping, non-territorial, morally constitutive 
communities. ‘The ideal number of appropriate democratic jurisdictions cannot be 
assumed to be embraced by just one level’ (Held 2004: 102). 
 With these introductory examples in mind, let us try to build a picture of the range 
of viewpoints in global ethics. 
 
 
II.  POSITIONS IN GLOBAL ETHICS: BROADENING OUR VIEW 
 
Dower’s classification 
 
 Nigel Dower’s exemplarily clear World Ethics - The New Agenda (1998) character-
izes and assesses three normative approaches to international relations and compares 
how they treat a series of broad problem fields. 
1. First, ‘sceptical realism’/ ‘international scepticism’ holds that countries (nation 
states / national States / …) overwhelmingly do and should pursue their own (long-
term) interests, even when that involves breaking agreements.  
2. Second, ‘internationalism’ and communitarianism hold that, while countries are the 
primary units on the world stage, held together internally as established communi-
ties, a community of countries emerges to some degree, for and through regulation 
of their interaction and mutual continuation. Within that community a modus viven-
di is established, with agreements which must be respected, just as within countries. 
The participants (the national States) remain predominantly ethical nationalists, so 
that the label ‘inter-nationalism’ fits this case better.vi 
3. Third come cosmopolitan positions, which hold that all humanity is the reference 
group in ethical discussions, some common values apply across humanity, and 
some responsibilities exist towards all humanity.
vii
 Three major variants are pre-
sented:  
 ‘libertarian-minimalism’ [Cosmopolitan 1], in which individuals and their liber-
ties are all that matter worldwide, not nations/States, which must not interfere 
with those liberties;  
 ‘idealism-dogmatism’ [Cosmopolitan 2], in which some more extensive set of 
values is deemed globally appropriate and to be promoted; ‘solidarist-globalist’ 
would be a more descriptive, less evaluative, label for this position; 
 ‘solidarism-pluralism’ [Cosmopolitan 3], in which global-wide concerns and 
obligations are emphasized but with large spaces accepted for variation in val-
ues and behaviour between settings. Dower adopts this position, and tries to de-
link valid points in communitarianism from its relativist and sectarian variants. 
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Thus Dower discusses five approaches in all. The classification goes further than many 
previous treatments. We will see how it still needs to be extended.  
 Of the positions we looked at, McKeever’s would most fit communitarianism. In 
contrast, the positions of some Indian emigres, whether mental or physical emigres, 
might approximate most to ‘libertarian-minimalism’, and lead us to distinguish two 
dimensions: the ethical status accorded to national boundaries, and the acceptance or 
not of pan-human obligations as opposed to obligations arising out of specific contracts 
or affinities.  
 Using these two dimensions, Dower’s five approaches can be compared and 
ordered as in Figure 1. This suggests how diverse is Dower’s ‘cosmopolitan’ family: it 
fills three of the four cells. Positions which meet either of the two criteria— low weight 
placed on national boundaries, and acceptance of global-wide values and responsibili-
ties—seem accepted as cosmopolitan, yet the two criteria are very different. One is the 
cosmopolitanism of free trade areas, the other that of priority to basic needs worldwide. 
Let us examine this further. 
 
Figure 1: An analysis of Dower's 
five-fold classification of 
approaches 
PAN-HUMAN VALUES & RESPONSIBILITIES ? 
HIGH LOW 
 
 
ARE NATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 
ETHICALLY 
IMPORTANT ? 
 
IMPORTANT 
 
‘Solidarist-pluralist’ 
(= Cosmopolitan 3) 
‘International sceptic’; 
 ‘Inter-nationalist’; 
Communitarian 
 
 
NOT 
IMPORTANT 
Full cosmopolitans 
(‘idealist-dogmatist’/ 
‘solidarist-globalist’; 
= Cosmopolitan 2) 
‘Libertarian-minimalist’, e.g. 
TNCs without national loyalties 
(= Cosmopolitan 1) 
 
Investigating and broadening the classification 
 
Dower’s classification and discussion seems to reflect still an International Relations 
(IR) tradition. International scepticism and inter-nationalism are views standard and 
central in the IR discipline. Dower's purpose is to recognize the range of starting points 
and then seek areas of agreement where different views can reach a common conclu-
sion even if by different routes. A declared solidarist-pluralist cosmopolitan, his own 
views thoughtfully mix elements drawn from the strengths of various philosophical 
traditions, with an emphasis on priority to fulfilment of common basic needs, as 
rationally required for the coherence of each tradition (including libertarianism). He 
concludes against strong versions of solidarist-globalism: ‘World government would 
only be acceptable when it would become unnecessary. So let us be good world citizens 
instead’ (1998: 196). World citizen here means member of a global political communi-
ty that is far less integrated than a state. 
 The IR-based classification needs to be elaborated. There are fewer differences in 
practice between ‘sceptical realists’ and ‘inter-nationalists’ than exist within the 
cosmopolitan category. Dower’s sceptics about inter-national morality manage to not 
also be sceptics about intra-national morality and duties; they can even be communitar-
ians intra-nationally. And while the libertarian-minimalists indeed give no priority to 
national boundaries but rather to personal boundaries—they deny having large 
responsibilities to almost any others, not only to foreigners—as a result they may be far 
closer on many international issues to the sceptics and nationalists than to other 
cosmopolitans. Dower’s statements about cosmopolitan views do not always hold for 
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libertarians who deny human solidarity and extensive obligations to others.
viii
 Further, 
some libertarians, zealots for unrestricted world markets, well fit Dower’s label 
‘idealist-dogmatist cosmopolitan’ even though not the content he attaches to the label. 
It seems better to distinguish that content by the separate label ‘solidarist-globalist’. 
 We need then not only two dimensions of classification—whether values and 
responsibilities of global scope are accepted or not; and whether or not national 
boundaries are considered important—to adequately grasp Dower’s five positions. We 
have to at least specify strong, intermediate and anti- views on each axis. We thereby 
identify four more positions, which Figure 2 below marks in italics. 
 
 
Figure 2: A fuller classification 
of viewpoints in global ethics 
PAN-HUMAN  VALUES  &  RESPONSIBILITIES ? 
EXTENSIVE MODEST / SLIGHT NONE 
 
 
 
 
ARE  
NATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 
ETHICALLY 
IMPORTANT ? 
VERY 
IMPORTANT 
 
1. ‘Scandinavian’ 2. ‘Inter-nationalist’ 3. ‘International 
sceptic’ 
 
 
INTERMEDIATE 
IMPORTANCE 
4. ‘Solidarist- 
pluralist’ 
[Cosmopolitan 3] 
5. TNCs with national 
loyalties/priorities but 
some accepted global 
duties 
6. Typical 
domestic 
corporation 
 
 
NOT 
IMPORTANT 
 
7. Full cosmopol-
itans (solidarist-
globalist) 
[Cosmopolitan 2] 
 
8. ‘Libertarian-
minimalist’,  e.g. 
TNCs without 
national loyalties but 
with some accepted 
necessary global 
duties  ['Soros’ -  
Cosmopolitan 1] 
 
9a) Business-only 
corporations 
9b) Robber-baron 
corporations  
9c) Family & clan 
‘corporations’  
9d) 'L'étranger' 
individuals 
 
Non-italicized positions = discussed by Dower. Italicized positions = not covered by Dower. 
 
 One of the four additions is perhaps typically Scandinavian (#1), a combination of 
strongly felt global responsibilities and strongly felt national identity and loyalty. There 
is no inconsistency between giving priority to needs at home while still having major 
concern for needs abroad. Concern for others, grounded in sympathy, is unlikely to 
suddenly cease at the national border. Lack of concern for foreigners is perhaps the 
more likely partner for a lack of concern for ‘fellow-citizens’.  
 There are disagreements on the minimum needed to maintain a libertarian system, 
and thus on the appropriate meaning of ‘libertarian-minimalism’. Consistent with 
Dower’s intentions, I here take it as the stance of a ‘pure’ transnational corporation 
(TNC), i.e. one without national loyalties, which yet actively seeks to sustain a system 
of global order (Position 8). It not only follows laws and agreements but is ready to 
invest in ‘global services’, perhaps also to maintain the credibility of an equal-
opportunity liberal ideology.
ix
 We could call it the Soros stance.  
 The other additions are possible business corporation viewpoints (# 5, 6 and 9) 
which differ from the Soros stance. Position 5 includes corporations which retain a 
primary national loyalty but do invest a certain amount in good causes worldwide; for 
example Ford or various Japanese TNCs. Position 6 includes corporations which have 
only the primary national loyalty: they feel some concern to maintain community 
viability in their home base, not elsewhere, but even this can be outweighed by the call 
of profit. Position 9a includes corporations which have no such national loyalty, nor 
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any geographically wider loyalties other than profit. In Position 9b the concern for 
profit and disregard for national jurisdictions leads to disregard for national laws too: 
the ‘robber-baron’ capitalist is ready to buy officials and politicians, not only (other) 
commodities.  
 The ‘neither-nor’ category also includes the cases we saw earlier: individuals or 
groups estranged from national loyalties (9c and 9d). The individual could even be 
estranged from almost any human loyalties, like Camus’s “L’Etranger”, a European 
colonist who casually kills an Arab (barely recognized as such, or as human) in French 
Algeria. We will consider later how far these Darwinian positions, the robber-baron and 
l’étranger, deserve to be called global ethics. L’étranger as colonialist, or even immi-
grant, continues as a major player worldwide (as currently in some instances in Israel, 
Brazil, and other locations).  
 Clearly identifiable as an ethic with worldwide obligations are the values of the 
family, lineage or clan which is spread across two or more countries and operates to 
provide members with support. A hybrid case that deserves separate attention are the 
criminal mafias, which combine ‘robber-baron’ predation, ‘family’ bonds, disregard for 
national bounds, and routine killing. The positions in cell 9’s neither-nor category 
might be called ‘post-liberal’; but historically speaking they seem ‘pre-liberal’ too. The 
number of variants suggests that one might later further refine the classification 
dimensions and labels.  
 Figure 2 already suffices for some important findings. Note first the distribution of 
attention across the various viewpoints. 
 Dower's IR-based classification (covering the non-italicized positions) is stronger in 
attention to the bottom-left to top-right diagonal in Figure 2. For it may have pre-
sumed correlation between positions in the two dimensions: that low ethical im-
portance given to national boundaries will conduce to acceptance of values and 
responsibilities with global scope, and vice versa. That assumption appears out-
moded (again). Positions along the top-left to bottom-right diagonal need major 
attention too. 
 Since States consider national boundaries (very) important, IR discourse has 
concentrated on positions like 2, 3 and even 4, but with position 7 as an idealist 
counterpart or outpost which matches the same belief in a correlation. 
 Positions in the bottom right of the diagram—position 8 and the family of positions 
in 9—may be growing. They hold that national boundaries are not ethically im-
portant, but that there are few or no responsibilities with global scope. 
 
 We can see secondly the value of multiple criteria in classification. Using two 
dimensions lets us tackle the ambiguity in the term ‘cosmopolitan’. Even the five 
positions covered by Dower are hard to fit into a single low-to-high sequence (is #8 
more cosmopolitan than #2, or vice versa ?). Cosmopolitanism in one respect (low 
weight to national boundaries) can be combined with extreme parochialism in the other 
(non-interest in foreigners). As we will explore in Section III of the paper, position 9 is 
thus more comprehensively sceptical than the ‘international sceptic’ position 3. It 
rejects national loyalties as well as trans-national pan-human ones. 
 Thirdly we see the need for more than binary contrasts along the dimensions. The 
gaps only emerge to view when we introduce intermediate positions. These allow us to 
resolve the uncomfortable grouping together of inter-nationalists and international 
sceptics at the top-right in Figure 1. Comparable unpacking of the bottom-right of that 
table reveals leads us to distinguish some fundamentally different viewpoints. In fact 
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we found it necessary to refine the categorization everywhere outside the full cosmo-
politan bottom-left cell of Figure 1: both the row above that cell and the column to its 
right needed to be divided. 
 A similar concern arises when one reads Charles Gore’s insightful picture of major 
positions and trends in development policy analysis (see Figure 3). The types of global 
ethic contained in his final column are very varied. 
 
Figure 3: Gore on paradigms 
in development policy 
analysis 
(Gore, 1996; Gore, 2000) 
 
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
National Global 
 
 
 
 
EXPLANATORY 
 
FRAMEWORK 
 
National 
Competing mainstream 
development paradigms pre-
1982, e.g. balanced v. unbal-
anced growth 
1. Dominant development 
paradigm post-1982 (labelled as 
‘Washington Consensus’) 
2. 1990s Sustainable Human 
Development 
 
Global 
Counter-currents pre-1982 (Latin 
American structuralism & 
dependency theory). 
East Asian models. 
Latin American neostructuralism 
 
Predicted paradigm shift in this 
direction 
 
 If we use Dower’s terms we might describe the ‘Washington Consensus’ as 
libertarian-minimalist. It is cosmopolitan in the sense that there is only one moral 
domain, but there are minimal (rather than zero) international obligations, just as there 
are minimal domestic obligations. UNDP’s Sustainable Human Development School is 
closer to a ‘solidarist-pluralist’ stance or, in its variants which emphasise human rights 
(notably the ‘human security’ discourse), to ‘solidarism-globalism’ (Gasper 2005). It 
makes a great difference for Gore’s predicted paradigm shift which of those cosmopoli-
tan ethics will be the future ‘global normative framework’. and also whether a shift into 
the bottom-right quadrant comes from the bottom-left or from the Washington Consen-
sus. One fears the emergence of perspectives based on a sophisticated global frame-
work for explanation and a consistently selfish, but global, normative framework. 
David Held’s ‘global compact’ (2004) corresponds in contrast to the extension of the 
human development approach. 
 We could further elaborate the classification in Figure 2. 
 One might change the definition of cosmopolitan so that it no longer spans two 
dimensions. One would then use 'cosmopolitan' (or ‘universalist' or ‘global’) simply 
to mean acceptance of the world as in important respects one moral domain (‘cos-
mos' as a ‘polis')x, across which members have some standard basic obligations and 
rights which should be respected for and by all;
xi
 ‘solidaristic’ for views in which 
such obligations and rights are relatively extensive, as in the mainstream human 
rights perspective; and ‘pluralistic' for respect for a plurality of ways of life and 
ethical conceptions. Robber barons can assert as universalists that the same values 
hold good everywhere, but be non-solidaristic in rejecting any extensive content to 
such values, any extensive obligations. 
 With respect to the question ‘values and responsibilities with global scope?’, we 
might distinguish between three types of commitment: 1. pan-human, 2. worldwide 
but restricted to some types of person (e.g. from one’s race or lineage or other net-
work), 3. internal to the national political unit. 
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 We might add other dimensions, for example concerning the level of agents being 
considered: state-corporation-ethne-clan/family-individual. 
However, there will be no perfect classification and we have enough refinement already 
to have gained important insights. We have added an entire column at the right of the 
table, in which attention to pan-human reponsibilities is zero; and discerned a range of 
possible business viewpoints (positions 5, 6, 8, 9a to 9c, in Figure 2). Let us now apply 
the classification to debates on international aid and international economic relations. 
We will, in particular, examine the final, rejectionist, column -- especially the well-
populated category 9, its ‘neither-nor’ hard core.  
 
 
III: ETHICS OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM  
 
Through the 1980s and 1990s most Northern governments' aid budgets declined 
steadily as a proportion of national income and public expenditure. Per capita aid for 
Africans fell by 40% in the 1990s. The question 'Has international aid to poorer 
countries the right to exist at all?' was kept on the agenda through the 1960s and 1970s 
by a small number of Right-wing theorists antagonistic to aid, such as Peter Bauer, and 
became a major focus in the 1980s.
xii
 The following set of viewpoints indicates the 
spectrum.
xiii
 
1. An obligation exists, the same as intra-nationally: International aid is seen as 
morally identical to resource transfers to poorer regions, groups or individuals within 
national boundaries (and domestic transfers are considered legitimate and desirable). 
Sometimes it is held that international aid should consequently be organised in a similar 
way to domestic transfers, routinised and with little space for discretion, as one part of 
welfare policy. But factual constraints differ in the international case and might 
profoundly affect and limit how and how far the rich can help.  
This viewpoint matches the solidarist-globalist cosmopolitan category. Dower 
argues that solidarist-globalist and solidarist-pluralist positions are divided not on the 
degree of commitment to help, but on how we should help. One suspects though that 
solidarism-pluralism is liable in practice to give priority to domestic clients, for 
example by placing a heavier burden of proof on international aid. 
2. Lesser obligation: Here, international aid is considered a moral obligation 
upon richer countries, groups and individuals, but subject to certain major conditions 
(for example concerning its urgency and expected efficacy; or about the existence of 
past and present North-South links), and is accorded in general lesser priority than 
obligations closer to home. This partly fits Scandinavia and the Netherlands, the donors 
who bind themselves to and implement a substantial target level of support; even if 
view 3, aid as charity, has influenced the manner in which they give.  
Thomas Nagel approves of international aid to deal with life-threatening and 
life-reducing conditions, but wishes not to place rich countries in the same moral 
community as poor countries. He asserts that ‘some form of humane assistance from 
the well-off to those in extremis is clearly called for quite apart from any demand of 
justice, if we are not simply ethical egoists’ (2005: 118; emphasis added). Nagel calls it 
‘mere humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need’ rather than ‘Justice as 
ordinarily understood’ (loc. cit.). In reality some others do not consider humanitarian 
assistance ‘clearly called for’, yet Nagel fails to argue for it other than by his ‘If A then 
A’ reference to ethical egoism. Even that reference fails: communitarians and others 
could be ethical altruists within their community yet reject the call to assist others 
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outside ‘it’. Nagel’s failure to ground his support for humanitarian assistance in terms 
of a base-level human moral community–the claim made in doctrines of human rights–
is matched by his failure to provide arguments on the other front too, against solidarist 
cosmopolitans, for why ‘justice as ordinarily understood’ is adequately understood. His 
conceptual schemas are artificial high-walled dichotomies, taken from an alleged 
‘ordinary understanding’ that is deemed self-endorsing: the moral community is the 
nation-state, the arena for justice; justice is presented as a highly demanding notion, 
and so too therefore is cosmopolitanism, presented as the call for application of ‘the full 
standards of justice’, globally (p.142); and wider humankind forms a sort of animate 
environment for ‘us’, in relation to which ‘we’ should bear witness to our non-egoism 
but yet are not bound by requirements of justice.
xiv
  
3. Charity: Here international aid is beyond obligation. To give it is an act of 
superogatory virtue and may be commendable. The work of development-oriented 
foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford, and Ted Turner’s immense (albeit tax-
reducing) donation to the U.N., may reflect such a stance of benevolent charity. But not 
giving aid cannot be condemned. The former Soviet bloc, for example, held that it had 
no historical links with and hence no present obligations to give aid to the South.  
4. My country first and only: aid to people in other countries is considered a be-
trayal of co-community members at ‘home’ who have unsatisfied needs and/or other 
claims—except when international aid furthers their interests better than would 
domestic uses. This position (e.g. Bauer, 1961) largely matches Dower's ‘international 
sceptic’ category. It influences some governmental aid, though not NGDO aid. 
5. A matter solely for individuals to decide: Charity may be commendable, and 
national boundaries insignificant, but in this viewpoint individual self-ownership makes 
both intra- and inter-national obligatory (i.e. tax-derived) transfers immoral. The view 
that foreign transfers by a national government are illegitimate was long followed by 
Switzerland.
xv
 It is an implication of the influential possessive-individualist philosophy 
of Robert Nozick (1974), presented for consideration in development policy by Deepak 
Lal (1976). Tax-based aid provided by a donor government, and aid from corporate 
profits, are both deemed illegitimate, unlike voluntary trans-national aid from individu-
als. The position matches a ‘business only’ stance by a private corporation, and an 
‘international sceptic’ position in a potential government donor.  
6. Morally indifferent: whether a person or group of persons (e.g. an organisa-
tion) chooses to help others, either in their country or another, is here considered an 
entirely optional consumer matter. To do so is no better or worse than any other (legal) 
use of their wealth. Charity is not commendable. This position matches less humanistic 
variants in Figure 2’s final column. A morally indifferent life-style option may be how 
most corporations view foreign aid (position 9a). 
7. Culturally relative: here the ‘consumer’, the entity that adopts life-style op-
tions, is an entire culture. Some cultures are ‘into’ helping others, others are not, and, 
claims this viewpoint, there are no defensible ways of saying one value position is 
better than the other. This ‘post-modern’ stance differs from the nationalist viewpoint—
which believes that its own position is better than others—but readily coexists with it. 
This position too matches Dower's communitarian category in part.  
 All of views 3 through 7 are widespread in the USA, including amongst powerful  
Republican politicians. A generation back, in the early days of the American New 
Right backlash, Sumberg (1973: 60) ‘looked for...without finding [any] duty laid upon 
us. There is no such duty... [Aid] is purely discretionary’, even in emergencies and—
according to him—even inside a nation. Typically in such views, attempted aid through 
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governments is seen as pernicious: a channelling of rewards via the ignorant and 
corrupt to the incompetent and work-shy. 
 The US government (and corporate) position in discussions on climate change fits 
position 3, the ‘international sceptic’. The US implicitly applies a market mentality in 
the discussions. Damage to others need not be culpable in a market framework, if not 
produced by direct assault or breach of a law. In fact the doctrine of competition 
demands that one try to inflict damage on competitors and indirectly on their employ-
ees and suppliers. After long denial of the damage, actual and impending, inflicted on 
others via environmental impacts of its high-gas lifestyle (twice the per capita green-
house gas emissions of the European Union), damage that is no longer credibly 
deniable can instead be defined away. As with a corporation found to be polluting a 
common resource and hence indirectly damaging others, the defence may be offered 
that no one has property rights over the common resource. Therefore those who have 
broken no law and who only indirectly and unknowingly may have harmed others are, 
supposedly, non blame-able (‘blame’ originally means ‘to speak ill of’). Within a 
defensive individualistic world-view, no blame means no responsibility for redress.
xvi
  
 The dispute over wider access to patented anti-AIDS drugs in the South, through 
low-cost supply from Southern companies, illustrates positions 6 and 9a, the stance of 
the business corporation, sometimes more charitably inclined in its home base. The 
patent-holding Northern pharmaceutical corporations sought for years to block access 
since they perceived it as at the cost of their profits and argued that the profits serve the 
long-run benefit of all by funding research. In reality such research is oriented towards 
the demands of those who can pay the most, not the needs in low-income countries. 
When one considers the scale of the health disaster and societal disaster in progress 
across much of Africa, its possible spillover effects, and the scale of the corporations’ 
past and ongoing profits and dividends, such future profit projections appear shortsight-
ed as well as obscene. But no exceptions were to be made - profit was rigorously 
defended: position 9a, business only. If an exception were made in this case, and needs 
put before projected profit, where would such argumentation stop? - nowhere short of 
dictatorship, has run the market mantra. Further, profit must be distributed to share-
holders, and managers, otherwise a corporation risks being taken over. The corpora-
tions claim in addition the long run superiority for all of the market system. It seems 
unlikely that they would have maintained the same stance if the people dying were in 
the heart of Europe or America, rather than Africa; in that case position 6 (giving some 
weight to human needs within the corporation’s country of origin) may become 
possible. In most of the North the gap between corporate profit needs and impoverished 
patients’ life needs would also be substantially bridged by government action.  
 The 19
th
 century American poet Walt Whitman outlined a cosmopolitan vision: 
 
One thought ever at the fore – 
That in the Divine Ship, the World 
breasting Time and Space, 
All peoples of the globe together sail, 
sail the same voyage, 
Are bound to the same destination. 
(Whitman 1995: 497) 
 
Whitman’s vision is perhaps least shared in his own country, or only in a version in 
which America steers the ship towards the destination that she sets, and periodically 
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disciplines passengers and junior crew, rather than a vision of global moral community. 
The ruling concept in America, when it extends to the outside world, is more how ‘The 
new Rome meets the new barbarians’, title for a 2002 piece by Joseph Nye, then dean 
of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and assistant secretary of 
defence in 1994-5. Writing in an international journal, the head of the leading Ameri-
can school of public affairs argued exclusively in terms of calculation of American 
national interest. Despite reference to requiring coalitions with others in order to defend 
American interests in areas like international financial stability, climate change, and the 
drugs trade, and notwithstanding awareness of the role of ‘soft power’, no generous 
word, no token of concern and esteem for other countries was used.  
 We can now consolidate certain key distinctions required within and beyond the 
'libertarian-minimalist' category. 
 Libertarian humanist positions. Some positions reject any distinction according to 
group or nation and declare respect for all individuals, who are to be as far as possi-
ble unconstrained, so far as consistent with equal freedom for others. 
 Libertarian anti-humanist positions: legal market power. In practice, however, the 
most important operationalization of libertarian conceptions is through power in the 
market, and this leads in a dramatically different direction. Individuals are weighted 
in proportion to financial strength. Individuals without purchasing power are ig-
nored. As we saw in the anti-AIDS drugs case, money-power’s forms of cosmopoli-
tanism and universalism are very different and anti-humanist, even though some-
times legitimized by use of libertarian humanist discourse. While these market-
based ethics formally centre on claims of providing fair process, their political via-
bility may rest as much on the theology that market operation does in the long run 
benefit everyone, as compared to the benefits from the real alternatives. 
 Libertarian anti-humanist positions: market power converted into lawless socio-
political power and immunity. In principle, markets operate with respect for laws 
established at both national and, increasingly predominant, international levels. In 
practice, however some market operators systematically evade and subvert both 
national and international rules. ‘Minimalism’ applies for the proclaimed limits to 
their obligations, not for the scope of their own interventions. 
For decades, traders from all over Europe have flocked to this lakeside Alpine town 
[Zug], attracted by stringent privacy laws, low tax rates and guarantees of corporate 
anonymity. But no one has achieved the dominance of Marc Rich, the billionaire met-
als dealer… [famous for] the business practices cited in his 1983 indictment for racket-
eering by the Southern District of New York -- trading with pariah states [e.g. as the 
leading supplier of oil to apartheid South Africa], manipulating the market for huge 
personal gain [e.g. cornering the international aluminium market in the early 1990s], 
hiding profits in a thicket of offshore companies…. While [Rich and his partner] de-
nied wrongdoing and refused to produce documents relating to the [1983] case, they 
ended up paying $200 million in back taxes and penalties in partial settlement… 
"There is a lawless quality about the way he operates", Mr. Weinberg [prosecutor in the 
1983 case] said. "He will do whatever he needs to do to close a deal." 
"He sees himself as a citizen of the world, unencumbered by the laws of sovereign na-
tions", said Howard Safir, a former U.S. marshal… 
(International Herald Tribune, 14 March 2001; italics added) 
 
Is this a global ethic? We would still need to consider Mr. Rich and his ilk even if it 
were not, as an analytically interesting and historically important outlier. Using 
Dower’s definition though (cited at the start of this paper), Rich’s “My Way” const i-
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tutes a system of ideas concerning the ethical obligations of human beings, individually 
or in groups, in their relations with individuals and groups throughout the world. But it 
would be an evolutionist
xvii
 or Nietzschean perfectionist ethic, in which unlimited 
contestation is claimed as the route to maximization of some excellence or prioritized 
qualities.
xviii
 It supports the extension of money power and market struggle to all 
matters: if one can buy aluminium, why not also voters, politicians, judges, legislators, 
regulators, even lives? The advocated rules apply universally and equally to all, to the 
strong and the weak. All are allowed to sleep under bridges, as Anatole France 
remarked; and the super-rich from anywhere are welcome in Zug. 
 
 
IV: CONCLUSION: the necessity of better descriptive ethics 
 
I have suggested the following points. 
 
1. Global ethics as a field of study and practice needs to pay considerable attention not 
only to bodies of published prescriptive doctrine. It must examine intently the ethics 
implicit in practice. 
2. It must in particular move beyond the state-centred perspectives and taxonomy of 
doctrines inherited from the academic field of International Relations; attend to 
agents other than the state; and not assume that views which accord low normative 
importance to national boundaries correlate strongly with views which grant high 
weight to the normative claims of people beyond those boundaries. Many national 
elites and other upwardly mobile groups seem de facto to reject both national and 
international moral community, except insofar as other people’s claims are heard 
through market signals.  
3. Normative IR and global ethics therefore must recognise and study positions which 
give neither national boundaries nor global pan-human obligations much ethical 
importance, the ‘neither-nor’ positions. These positions take individuals or groups 
as the relevant units, rather than nations, and do not revolve around debates advo-
cating or denying duties between nations. It is not appropriate to group these views 
together as ‘cosmopolitan’ with other views which deny the moral priority of na-
tional boundaries. 
4. Insofar as the label ‘cosmopolitan’ has ambigously spanned those two dimen-
sions—(i) whether or not values and/or responsibilities of global scope are accept-
ed; and (ii) whether or not national boundaries are considered normatively im-
portant—we could now reserve 'cosmopolitan' (or ‘universalist’) for acceptance of 
the world as in important respects one moral domain, across which members have 
some obligations and rights; and use ‘solidaristic’ for views in which such obliga-
tions and rights are relatively extensive. 
5. Within dimension (i), we must further distinguish whether global commitments, if 
accepted, are: 1. pan-human or 2. worldwide but restricted to some types of person 
(e.g. from one’s race or lineage). In the second case, the rejection of national moral 
community and pursuit of advancement on a global stage by many groups is often 
buttressed by the social capital and morality of their networks of kin and region, in 
some cases with their own functional equivalents of an international income tax. 
Communitarianism is alive and thriving at a global scale. 
6. The ‘neither-nor positions’ seem to be relatively neglected in IR discourse. We 
noted: 9a) the business-only market agent, who pursues only profit but within the 
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law; 9b) the ‘robber-baron’ market agent, who pursues only profit—period—and 
may use a Darwinian-Nietzschean perfectionist ethic; 9c): the ‘family corporation’, 
operating communally on a world scale; and 9d): the individual estranged from 
national and even active communal affiliations, perhaps pursuing some personal 
life-project while or by working for the global corporations and consuming their 
products. 
7. Relatedly, ‘libertarian-minimalist’ ethics deserve closer attention and subdivision. 
(Table 2 distinguishes four relevant positions: 5, 6, 8 and 9a, not one.) The formal 
libertarian-minimalist ethics referred to in IR literature arguably do not cover the 
reality of business-only practice (Position 9a). As a body of doctrine a libertarian-
minimalist ethic is likely to present itself as strongly concerned with individuals and 
their freedom (e.g. Nozick, 1974) and thus with ensuring the necessary precondi-
tions for such freedom (Position 8). In business-only practice, however, liberal 
doctrine becomes operationalized through market calculations which weight people 
by purchasing power and ignore those who have none. Our analysis of aid ethics 
showed further relevant divisions, notably concerning whether aid is seen as com-
mendable even if not obligatory.  
8. The relative analytic neglect of ‘neither-nor’ positions and some variants of 
libertarian thought are major substantive omissions for understanding the contem-
porary world. Market theology is strongly entrenched, as seen in the climate change 
discussions and in the long sustained attempts by drugs companies to have their 
familiar level of profit override the needs of AIDS sufferers. And the theology of 
Position 8 diverges from the usual actual practice of Position 9a, where only money 
talks in the market and big money has a megaphone; let alone from Position 9b, 
where all of life becomes a market. Amongst ‘neither nationalist nor solidarist’ 
positions, some are not humanist either.  
9. We gain from a complex classification of views, with explicit dimensions of 
comparison and more than binary contrasts in each dimension. The main classifica-
tion scheme used in this paper (Table 2 above) proved helpful, but we are straining 
at its limits and further refinement could be worthwhile. Applications are vital, 
however, to make the distinctions vivid, communicable, and demonstrably useful, 
and to deepen our awareness, before attempting much more taxonomy. 
 
 My main purpose has been descriptive rather than predictive or directly prescrip-
tive: to provide better categories and ways of thinking about categorization, as a 
prelude to more detailed description. I have argued that the ‘neither nationalist nor 
solidarist’ positions, including anti-humanist variants, are massive, even central, in the 
modern world and are growing. They must be recognized and studied. Cohesive 
national communities, bound by social contracts within clear national containers, 
judiciously if sceptically pursuing some interpretation of their group interest in the 
world arena, cannot be presumed. More attention is needed to the constitution of the 
‘us’, ‘we’, and ‘self’ in post-modern consumerism. We have to revise and extend our 
categories as we move from normative inter-national relations to global ethics. 
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i An extensively revised version of Working Paper 341, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. 
ii I will use ‘global ethics’ in preference to ‘world ethics’. ‘World’ suggests world-level organizations, 
world-powers, etc., whereas ‘global’ suggests the sphere, across which numerous projects link and sum. 
iii See Held (2004) for a readable survey. 
iv See Gasper (1986), Section 7: ‘Nationalist and Internationalist Ethics’. 
v For powerfully argued other views, of the global business corporation as now dominant, see Korten 
(1995) and Harrod (2001). 
vi The inter-national norms and agreements concern notably: respect for sovereignty; rules of warfare, 
rules of diplomacy, and the very principle of respecting agreements.  
vii In Erskine’s terminology, we refer here to ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’, not to world government. 
viii Dower is not exceptional here. Caney for example presumes that ‘No cosmopolitan argues for 
anything less than this [considerable international redistribution to alleviate poverty]’ (2000: 526). 
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ix The maverick billionaire George Soros has in fact a unique hybrid stance: he seeks to build national 
civil societies and effective polities, with the profits from his global financial speculation that under-
mines national economic sovereignty. 
x According to the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, polites = citizen, and cosmopolitanism is the 
doctrine that we are citizens of a world.community. 
xi Given now entrenched usages of ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘universalist’ may be the better label. Its referent in 
the text is consistent with Pogge’s definition of moral universalism. 
xii See Gasper (1986), Riddell (1987) and Opeskin (1996) for surveys of the debate. 
xiii This section builds on Gasper (1999). 
xiv Nagel calls his approach a ‘discontinuous’ political conception (p.141). He employs: a partitioning by 
definition, whereby ‘justice’ is concerned with the inequalities between people, while ‘humanitarian 
duties hold in virtue of the absolute rather than the relative level of need of the people we are in a 
position to help’ (Nagel 2005: 119) -- as if justice does not arise in relation to matters of absolute need; 
and secondly, a maneuver by which ‘The full standards of justice’ (p.121) become the sole form of 
justice, via the notion of what ‘merit[s] the full name of justice’ (p.122). By p.140 he thus stipulates that 
‘Justice applies, in other words, only to…’ what one might see as one, special, case thereof. 
xv
 Switzerland is home too to the amoral or Darwinian Swiss banks and the genuinely charitable 
International Committee of the Red Cross, an international affairs committee with exclusively Swiss 
membership. ‘International’ in this label refers instead to the Darwinian mess in the world outside. 
xvi On this world-view in the work of Hayek, see Gasper (1986), Section 5: Absolutization of Just 
Process. 
xvii Inheritance of acquired characteristics is Lamarckean rather than Darwinian. 
xviii In Rawls’s sense, perfectionism in ethics holds that we should maximize excellence in art, science 
and culture (The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy). Thomas Hurka defines it as promoting the 
expression  and fulfilment of those features which are deemed to make humans human - e.g. for Aristotle 
rationality, for Marx productive activity, or for Nietzsche the exercise of the will to power (Hurka, 
1993:3). He delineates Nietzsche’s views as a form of perfectionism, including the principle of 
maximizing the quality of a minority of the best individuals. 
